November 19, 2008

Anthrax Exposure: Inquiring Minds Want to Know Who’s Responsible?

Supreme Court of Florida: US v. Maureen Stevens

Robert Stevens worked for American Media Inc., publishers of the National Enquirer. In 2001, letters containing anthrax were sent to a number of recipients, including American Media in Florida. Mr. Stevens died from inhaling the anthrax. His wife sued the United States (it was their anthrax) and Battelle Memorial Institute, a private facility that produced Bacillus Anthracis for the government.

Both cases ended up in Federal Court. The suit by the widow Stevens alleged that the anthrax that killed her husband could be traced to the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, that the Feds knew it was “ultra hazardous,” that samples had been missing since 1992 and that there was a failure to provided adequate security for handling and shipping such materials, which were somehow intercepted and ended up in an envelope addressed to American Media’s Florida offices, killing her husband when he unknowingly inhaled its contents. The suit against Batelle made similar claims about lack of security, failure to monitor employees and negligence in the handling and transport of Anthrax causing it to end up in the wrong hands.

Both defendants moved to dismiss claiming they could not be responsible if their Anthrax was stolen and that such intervening criminal acts relieved them from responsibility for the death of Robert Stevens.
The Federal District Court denied defendants’ motions after looking to Florida law to see whether Mrs. Stevens’ anthrax theory of negligence was recognized in the Sunshine State. It concluded that Florida law supported the widow’s claim under the state’s “foreseeable zone of risk” theory. The government moved for reconsideration, which was denied, but it was granted leave to have this question answered by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: What duties exist under Florida law to protect members of the public where an organization creates a significant risk by using anthrax or another ultra-hazardous material.” The Eleventh Circuit then sent that question to the Florida High Court to answer.

Obviously this sort of question affects everyone. If the Government wants to make anthrax, well, fine. If it has to get it from a lab, well, where else can it shop for the stuff. But if it’s going to have it delivered by messenger, or FedEx or UPS or its own private couriers, shouldn’t there be some awareness that it could kill unsuspecting and uninvolved people who come in contact with it, and some meaningful precautions to prevent that from happening? And shouldn’t those who make, handle and ship anthrax to wherever anthrax gets shipped, make sure that they have an inventory system that at least rivals Wal-Mart and a security system as advanced as Blockbuster’s. Or do the government and its labs get a pass because their anthrax work is so vital that the best we can hope for is that none of us end up on the wrong mailing list.

Not quite.

You’ll be happy to know that the Florida Supreme Court found that widow Stevens has a right to sue. Whether the anthrax was misplaced, pocketed, or fell off the truck (or out of the Petri dish), the court concluded that the greater the risk of harm to others, the greater the duty to avoid injury to others:

In coping with the heightened duty that comes with this risk, the government and Battelle are required to contemplate a countless variety of situations in which a reasonable laboratory in their position must anticipate and guard against the unauthorized interception and dissemination of the dangerous substance. Given the allegations of negligent security of the ultrahazardous material and the virtual impossibility of potential victims to protect themselves once this substance is at large, this is obviously one of those cases...where the risk of injury is great and the corresponding duty of the lab is heightened. In a very real sense, it is this inability to measure the extent of this risk that merits giving the claimants an opportunity to go forward.

So for Mrs. Stevens, it’s back to the Federal Court with her golden ticket in hand. Now that she has the right to proceed, it remains to be seen if she has the right evidence to prevail.

We should all applaud her persistence since what happened to Robert could have happened to any one of us. If the Government and its labs don’t know how to keep track of their toxins and plagues or properly monitor the scientists and employees who make and transport powdered death, they shouldn’t be allowed to play with it.

One hates to think that the only powder they can be trusted with is Tang.


October 2, 2008

Auto Insurance: The Eyes Have It! Murder as a Matter of Perspective

Appellate Division, Second Department: State Farm v. Langan

In politics you have to “follow the money” to figure out why some laws pass and others don’t. In automobile accidents, you have to figure out if there’s insurance coverage to compensate the injured party. That’s especially tricky if the car is a murder weapon.

On February 12, 2008 Neil Spicehandler was struck and fatally injured by a car driven by Ronald Popadich. Popadich was on a murderous spree which included killing a neighbor, shooting a cabbie, attempting and then succeeding in running down a pedestrian, namely, the late Mr. Spicehandler. In September 2005 Popadich pleaded guilty to second degree murder.

The guilty verdict presented a tough issue for John Langan, Administrator of the Estate of Mr. Spicehandler. How can you collect in a civil suit from a driver who intends to kill the victim? Intentional criminal acts are not covered by automobile insurance. Accidents are. Since this was no accident, there was no way to collect from any policy issued for the murderous driver’s vehicle. So Langan looked to his own State Farm auto policy, which he claimed covered Spicehandler in two ways. State Farm, in turn, sued to have the case dismissed and to free it from any financial responsibility under Langan’s auto policy since this was murder, plain and simple.

Maybe not so plain or simple. First, the court agreed that Spicehandler’s Estate could not collect under the uninsured motorist endorsement of Langan’s policy. The uninsured motorist endorsement (of the injured party’s insurance policy) provides coverage for a person when the offending car has either no insurance or limited insurance; it then kicks in as if it were the coverage for the other car, or it kicks in to provide additional coverage above what the other car carried. As the court said, since Popadich couldn’t have coverage for his intentional act of murder, “it follows, then, that, because no coverage would have been provided under a standard automobile liability policy issued to Papadich, State Farm is not obligated to provide benefits under the uninsured motorist endorsement of its policy with Langan.”

So State Farm is clear? Not quite.

Langan pointed to his State Farm policy’s “mandatory personal injury protection endorsement and its death, dismemberment, and loss of sight provisions” and said this was still an accident as that’s defined in his policy and State Farm had to pay. The court agreed.

Even though Mr. Spicehandler was murdered, an intentional act from the viewpoint of the murderer, from the viewpoint of the one murdered “the event was ‘unexpected, unusual and unforeseen’ and not brought about by the insured’s own ‘misconduct, provocation or assault.’” And it was the covered individual’s perspective that governed. Without a specific exclusion for injury or death caused by an intentional act in the State Farm Policy, the insurance company was on the hook and obligated to provide benefits because murder or not, Mr.Spicehandler didn't see death coming.

The old TV show was called Murder, She Wrote. For the Insurance carrier, unless it writes an exclusion for murder, the events are seen from the victim’s eyes, and one thing everyone can agree on is that from the victim’s perspective, murder is “unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”

One suspects that to State Farm Insurance this decision was also “unexpected, unusual and unforeseen” and that it never knew it was going to get murdered in court.


July 16, 2008

Insurance Limits: Drinking, Driving & Death

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: Stamp v. Metroplitan Life Ins. Co.

If you get so drunk—3 times the legal limit—that you crash your car into a tree and die as a result, does your family collect from your accidental death and dismemberment life insurance policy? Affirming the Rhode Island District Court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals says your family does not collect anything. The policy in question did not clearly define what an “accident” was, so the court had to: It concluded that Mr. Stamp was “so highly intoxicated that his death was not an ‘accident.’” It went on to find that when you are behind the wheel this drunk, you should “objectively and reasonably” expect to die or be seriously injured.

The dissent saw it differently, finding that Mr. Stamp did not set out to kill himself and that the circumstances of his death were no more than a “fatal mistake.” Under the circumstances, his wife should have collected from the insurance policy.

Fatal mistakes cannot be undone. Think twice before you get behind the wheel drunk. You may kill yourself and your family’s chances of surviving without you.