October 26, 2009

Cyber Stalking: What a Wicked Web We Weave

US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: United States v. Fullmer et. al.

We live in very contentious times. The red-state-blue-state divide is political, geographical and cultural. Debate about issues is frequently obscured by the politics of hate, by innuendo and by ad hominum attacks on those who speak out on the issues. Whether you support Rush Limbaugh or Al Gore, Sara Palin or Barack Obama, there seems to be way less common ground than in times past—and way less interest in even finding it.

Everything has become a crisis. Everything has become an issue that cannot be compromised. And everything is magnified and disseminated exponentially, courtesy of the worldwide web. Just a click away, a wonderful and dreadful thing the web: both a fountain of breaking news, information and learning and a cesspool of violence, pornography and hatred all at once.

Perhaps there’s no other tool with the power to destroy lives and reputations so easily. Bloggers can be indifferent to facts. Rumormongers can ruin lives with a well placed post. And anyone with a computer can upload their own demise on line or set in motion events that lead to the demise of others.

Somewhere between on-line beheadings and spam, we find US. v. Fullmer.

The case is about the activities of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) and six individual defendants (referred herein collectively as “SHAC”) who were either employees, principals or in some way associated with SHAC. SHAC was formed in 1999. It has been uncompromisingly opposed to Huntingdon’s research with animals and committed to closing its laboratories. According to SHAC, Huntingdon was a purveyor of animal cruelty in the interest of science and corporate profits. Its abuses of animals were depicted in a surveillance videotape (viewer discretion advised) obtained by someone posing as a Huntingdon lab technician. When aired on British TV, it led to a spate of protests and the birth of SHAC-UK and subsequently, its US counterpart after SHAC’s relentless campaign caused Huntingdon to relocate to the states.

SHAC’s opposition to Huntingdon was not based on the actions of Gandhi or Martin Luther King. It was something new. Something born out of the cyber age. It targeted Huntingdon and companies that dealt with it, from accounting firms, bankers and realtors, to Huntingdon board members, stockholders and employees, including their wives and children. SHAC used its website as a bludgeon. Its take-no-prisoners, scorched-earth approach to its mission was incredibly effective. And frightening. As defendant Gazzola put it, “this is the most successful campaign in the history of the animal rights movement and it’s precisely because we’re pushing the limits and we’re tired of standing around holding signs and yelling at buildings and writing letters and not getting anywhere. We’re gonna do what we have to do in order to be effective and in order to save lives.”

The court’s opinion chronicles a sampling of the SHAC defendants’ activities. Its web postings included the following:

-Coordinating protests;
-Encouraging direct action (both legal and illegal, the illegal kind being both lauded and disavowed simultaneously);
-Instructing economic sabotage (including step-by-step how-to instructions as well as posting times for coordinated electronic assaults on corporate servers and fax machines);
-Listing accomplishments (such as people and places that had been attacked or acquiesced to SHAC’s demands); and
-Promoting vandalism (or at least excusing and appreciating it as a natural overflow of anti-Huntingdon outrage).

In a message to all associated with or employed by Huntingdon, defendant Harper used the backdrop of successful personal and institutional attacks to put Huntingdon and its business partners on notice of SHAC’s reach: “animal abusers …may be safe from the cops, the army, and the FBI…they are not safe from us…If no one else will treat them like the criminal scum that they are, at least we will…It is time to go beyond our fear of reprisals.”

Given the contents of the surveillance video, some might find such hard-edged tactics acceptable. But there was more. There were physical attacks and protests at board members’ homes. There were personal threats to them. To their children. Home addresses were published on the web. Phone numbers were published. Houses were flooded, windows smashed and neighbors intimidated. There was the posting of the “Top 20 Terror Tactics.” There were death threats by email and phone. And there was a state of fear that was nurtured and encouraged by SHAC.

SHAC’s web page, while always disavowing illegal activity, sympathized with its supposed unknown, more violent compatriots, and published instructions about how to avoid detection or arrest for such activity (even a cursory reading of the court’s decision is like a manifesto on modern economic warfare by cyber means—in many ways, it’s as disturbing as the Huntingdon video). Those targeted lived in abject fear for their lives, some to the point of arming themselves, others to the point of surrender, acquiescing to SHAC’s demands rather than resisting them alone.

Defendants were eventually charged and convicted of a variety of offenses, including conspiracy to violate the Animal Enterprise Protection ACT (AEPA protects those who use animals for testing from certain forms of animal-rights activity), conspiracy to commit interstate stalking as well as three substantive counts of stalking.

On appeal, defendants argued, among other things, that the convictions violated their First Amendment right to engage in civil disobedience and to voice their objections to Huntingdon’s activities. The court disagreed. While some postings on SHAC’s website were protected speech, notwithstanding it was “speech that many find offensive and uncomfortable,” other posts which “coordinate electronic civil disobedience and disseminate the personal information of individuals employed by Huntingdon and affiliated companies are more problematic.” Such communication was not protected speech and some “constituted ‘true threats.’”

As the court observed, “viewed in context, the speeches, protests, and web postings were all tools to further their effort” and were not speech protected by the First Amendment. They were crimes. Accordingly, the individual defendants received sentences ranging from one year to six years in prison.

We are left with a number of questions: Are these people heroes in the animal rights movement? Should they be applauded for putting their lives on the line for their beliefs (even belatedly, since on line, they denied personal involvement)? Are they simply zealots who did what was necessary to save animals?

Or are they thugs? Bullies? And political / business terrorists?

Those on the receiving end of their “protests” would vote for the latter category. Many who share SHAC’s views might see them as visionaries. But the question remains: What type of society are we evolving into?

Maybe the ends justify the means when it comes to animals. How about when it comes to global warming? To illegal immigration? To mandatory vaccines for H1N1? To gun control or legalizing marijuana?

Are we inexorably on a road that takes no prisoners in a winner-take-all battle over everything? Or have we already crossed the Rubicon when it comes to civil discussion and the common good?

Sometimes it looks and feels that way. Sometimes it looks and feels like we are willingly letting the common ground beneath our feet slip away, completely indifferent or oblivious to the fact that we are falling into something much more dangerous and intolerant and insidious—all in the interest of advancing THE cause.

Which, of course, says something either about our lack of powers of persuasion or our inability or unwillingness to listen to the other side. Or to lose gracefully. In the market place of ideas that is America, the wheat has always been separated from the chaff, which historically has brought out the best in America, and which hopefully, will continue to do so even as the internet has the potential to bring out the worst.

Still, we should be glad about this uniquely American problem because freedom of speech can only be abused where it exists in the first place.

November 10, 2008

Jews for Jesus: Damnation, Salvation or Defamation?

Supreme Court of Florida: Jews for Jesus v. Edith Rapp

There’s a fine, not always so-clear line, between church and state which seems too often to turn on whose ox is being gored or ignored. There’s a different line that can be crossed between individuals when religion is an issue: It’s called defamation. And it’s about as hazy a line as the church-state line. This is a perfect case in point.

Here are the facts: Bruce Rapp is Jewish. He also believes in Jesus and worked for Jews for Jesus, an outreach group which shares the Gospel of Christ with other Jews. His Jewish father Marty and step-mother Edith lived in Florida. Bruce’s father was dying and Bruce spent months sharing his faith with dad, believing that acceptance of Jesus, even for Jews, is the way to salvation. The court quoted Bruce’s account of events from the Jews for Jesus newsletter:

“I had a chance to visit with my father in Southern Florida before my Passover tour. He has been ill for sometime and I was afraid that I may not have another chance to be with him. I had been witnessing to him on the telephone for the past few months. He would listen and allow me to pray for him, but that was about all. On this visit, whenever I talked to my father, my stepmother, Edie (also Jewish), was always close by, listening quietly. Finally, one morning Edie began to ask me questions about Jesus. I explained how G-d [sic] gave us Y’Shua (Jesus) as the final sacrifice for our atonement, and showed her the parallels with the Passover Lamb. She began to cry, and when I asked her if she would like to ask G-d for forgiveness for her sins and receive Y’Shua she said yes! My stepmother repeated the sinner’s prayer with me-praise G-d! Pray for Edie’s faith to grow and be strengthened. And please pray for my father Marty’s salvation.”

This newsletter was published on the internet. It was seen by one of Edith’s relatives (why was she looking at the Jews for Jesus website?). As any Jewish believer in Jesus knows, such news is frequently not well received by Jewish relatives and friends. Whatever Edith did or didn’t do in private, when Bruce’s account of her salvation experience hit cyberspace and became family news, Edith sued.

Edith’s complaint was that Jews for Jesus defamed her by claiming, without her permission, that she had “joined Jews for Jesus, and/or [become] a believer in the tenets, the actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.” Her complaint alleged “(1) false light invasion of privacy; (2) defamation; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

Jews for Jesus moved to dismiss. After considerable battles over whether Edith’s suit even stated a cause of action, after she re-filed new and improved claims and after further motions, the lower court dismissed all of Edith’s claims. Edith appealed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the defamation claim concluding “the ‘common mind’ reading the newsletter would not have found Edith to be an object of ‘hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace.’” In doing so, it also rejected this generally accepted standard for defining defamation: “a communication is defamatory if it ‘prejudiced’ the plaintiff in the eyes of a ‘substantial and respectable minority of the community.’” As for the tort of false light, the court was uncertain such a claim existed in Florida. That question was certified to the Florida Supremes to answer and was taken up by Jews for Jesus.

Essentially, the high court found that defamation and false light claims have many of the same elements: “[F]alse light has the following six elements: (1) publicity; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity; (4) actual damages; (5) publicity must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (6) publicity must be about the plaintiff.” “Defamation has the following five elements: (1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory.”

After reviewing the history of false light claims in Florida and elsewhere, the high court concluded that false light is based on a subjective standard, i.e.,“publicity [which] must be highly offensive to a reasonable person” and thus creates a “moving target whose definition depends on the specific locale in which the conduct occurs or the particular sensitivities of the day.” Accordingly, it dismissed the false light claim. Score one for Jews for Jesus.

But given the sensitivities that surround Jewishness and Jesusness, perhaps more so in Florida than in many other states, the court also scored one for Edith: It found that “the Fourth District failed to embrace the standard that a communication is defamatory if it prejudices the plaintiff in the eyes of a ‘substantial and respectable minority of the community.’” So it reinstated the defamation claim and left it to the lower court to figure out if Edith was prejudiced in front of a “substantial and respectable minority of the community,” namely her Jewish friends and family.

While the District Court found that the “the ‘common mind’ reading the newsletter would not have found Edith to be an object of ‘hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace’" for believing in Jesus, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a potential cost to a Jewish person to profess faith in Jesus or to be spoken about as if they did. A “substantial and respectable minority” may disapprove and cause one to suffer real damages.

Since Jesus walked the earth there has always been a personal cost to Jews who profess faith in Jesus and the issue for the individual has always been the same: Is it worth the cost?

For Bruce Rapp it was. For Edith Rapp, the jury’s still out. As for whether it's defamation to say someone believes in Jesus, it depends which side of the line you're on and what you believe about crossing it.


October 28, 2008

Websites: Cyber Suit

New York Supreme Court: Bossy v. Camelback

Solicitation Plus. It sounds like what brought down the former governor of New York. It's not quite as juicy, but without it, your New York case against a foreign corporation with a website on the net goes nowhere.

Why is this important? It depends how you use the internet.

In this case, Evan Bossy was injured when he skied into an unpadded pole on the beginner trail at Camelback, a ski resort located in Pennsylvania. Evan’s parents brought suit in New York on Evan’s behalf, suing Camelback for negligence.

Camelback moved to dismiss the case, claiming it could not be sued in New York because the court had no personal jurisdiction over this out-of-state corporation. Camelback runs a ski resort in Pennsylvania. It is not a New York corporation (any business incorporated outside of New York is a foreign corporation). It has no employees or offices in New York, was not negligent in New York and does not transact business in New York.

It does, however, have a website. Plaintiffs claim that Camelback is always “doing business” in New York “by virtue of its constant presence here through its interactive website” where skiers can book reservations and purchase lift tickets on line. Moreover, Camelback “solicits” New York customers by “placement of advertising flyers in New York retail ski shops.”

The question is whether this is enough business to be considered doing business as that is defined by New York law. According to the court, it’s not enough and it dismissed the case. An interactive website alone will not give you jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. You need more. You need “the presences of traditional indicia of doing business” or substantial and continuous solicitation...coupled with financial and commercial dealings or other activities of substance in New York,” i.e., solicitation plus.

Even if the court treated Camelback's interactive website as a constant solicitation, absent other factors such as engagement in financial or commercial dealing or other activities of substance in New York, such cyber-office-space does not meet the solicitation plus threshold which would confer jurisdiction on this foreign corporation. Under the circumstances, proper venue would either be Federal Court or Pennsylvania.

So back in New York, case dismissed. Such is the result of applying Flintstone rules to Jetson-age problems. One suspects the state legislature and the higher courts will eventually have to sort through all the nuances of cyber commerce, but until then these matters will be resolved on a website by website basis.

What does that mean for web browsers and shoppers in the Empire State? The home page may get the home court advantage if there’s a problem on line. And it means buyer beware when you add to your cart.

July 27, 2008

Internet Divorce: I O YouTube

New York Supreme Court: Smith v. Walsh-Smith

It's a brave new world and YouTube is at the cutting edge. From the same computer you download directions or songs for your iPod, you can upload and stream videos to a worldwide audience. Now that's power! And possible trouble. Tricia Walsh-Smith is a case in point.

Tricia married Philip Smith, a man 25 years her senior. Philip started out as a theater usher and ended up president of the Shubert Organization, "the largest theater owner and operator in the United States." Notwithstanding his success, Mr. Smith is a very private man. Apparently, Mrs. Walsh-Smith had issues about the terms of their prenuptial agreement and about her husband's unwillingness to invest $250,000 in her theatrical production. Without his money, the show would not go on. These issues ripened into heated arguments, flying crockery and threats by the missus to malign Mr. Smith in the New York Post. True to her word, the Post got the dirt on Mr. S. As a result, he filed for divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.

She sued him back. She also availed herself to some self-help. Not satisfied that she was mustering the necessary leverage to obtain a favorable outcome or an out-of-court settlement to her liking, the angry wife took her beef to the internet. Having come to appreciate the value of a good production, she brought a film crew into the marital apartment, added music and subtitles, and trashed her husband on video. She then posted it on YouTube, which turned out to be her big break. The video was an "overnight sensation" and has been viewed more than three million times.

Fame has its cost, however. It is no easy task to prove cruel and inhuman treatment in divorce court, but Mrs. Walsh-Smith's internet histrionics gave Mr. Smith all the proof he needed. As the court stated, "He has been publically humiliated and embarrassed to an unprecedented extent." Mrs. Walsh-Smith claimed "she had no other option" because of her finances. The judge was not moved, noting that other spouses have been similarly challenged without resorting to the internet, and concluded that "it is hard to say defendant had no other choice when no one else before her had ever exercised that choice." Accordingly, the court granted Mr. Smith his divorce. As for Mrs. Smith, she might have gone where no woman has gone before, but she owes YouTube the credit for the outcome in her divorce.

YouTube is power: Become famous (or infamous) overnight. Jump start a career. Or attack your enemies (or your spouse) on a global scale from the convenience of your home. It might seem like a handy tool to advance your interests, but we are learning it comes with responsibilities. You can't use the internet as a weapon to humiliate or embarrass people with impunity. (In an unrelated but similar case, a Florida judge required two teens who had thrown a large drink at the drive-thru cashier—an activity its purveyors call "fire in the hole"—to post a groveling apology on YouTube after they first posted their own home-made video of their mean-spirited carbonated assault.) We'll see what new and inspiring or insipid ways the internet will be used tomorrow, and just how creative the courts will have to become to deal with it.

Until then, post at your own risk.