New York Injury Attorney Blog

New York State Appellate Division, Second Department: McCabe v. Dutchess County

The rule in New York is that a child cannot sue his or her parents for damages resulting from negligent supervision. Kids always have accidents growing up. It’s part of life, not part of litigation. What about suing a foster parent? And suing the Department of Social services for placing you with the foster parent who was in charge when you got hurt?

According to the Second Department, the answer is the same: No can do.

Taylor Harris is the biological mother of 6 year old Jacob Harris. The mom had a drug problem. At birth, Jacob was found to have cocaine, opiates, marijuana and methadone in his urine. The hospital contacted Social Services and the child was placed in foster care with Diane Sherwood, one of the defendants to this action. About 16 months later, while living in the Sherwood home, Jacob climbed out of his “sleeping accommodation onto an adjacent dresser and fell to the floor.” Taylor regained custody soon thereafter and, ever the vigilant mom, commenced this action for money damages on the child’s behalf.

Sherwood and Dutchess County both moved for summary judgment. The lower court denied their motions. Both appealed.

Relying on Holodook v. Spencer, the Court of Appeals decision that held a child could not sue his folks for negligent supervision, the Second Department reversed and dismissed the case. As the high court observed in Holodook, “We can conceive a few, if any, accidental injuries to children which could not have been prevented, or substantially mitigated, by keener parental guidance, broader foresight, closer protection and better example,” but, “[i]f the instant negligent supervision claims were allowed, it would be the rare parent who could not conceivably be called to account in the courts for his conduct towards his child…” Loosely translated: Kids get hurt, even when raised by the most diligent parents. Such accidents are not actionable.

“These same considerations apply to foster parents,” the McCabe court said, and “[w]e decline to impose such a heavy burden on foster parents.” To do so would discourage qualified and much needed individuals from becoming foster parents in the first instance, and would open the door to retaliatory suits brought by disgruntled biological parents or by difficult foster children.

Similarly, the Department of Social Services can hardly be held responsible for the type of accident that can happen in any home, even if it results in serious injury. Only when there's “sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury,” can the foster care agency be held liable.

The actions by Ms. Harris were dismissed.

If this had gone the other way, one wonders whether young Jacob Harris could have filed suit against mother Taylor Harris for the drug problem he was born with, the injury which landed him in foster care to begin with. Ms. Taylor may not have thought her course of action all the way through to its logical end, but there might have been some measure of justice had her son obtained a judgment against her.

The victory here goes to common sense. Unmitigated gall takes the loss. And along the way, the court fosters a new appreciation for how difficult it is to raise kids, no matter who's taken on the job.

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Posted In: Damages , Injuries , Minors , New York State Courts , Strange but True

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Supreme Court, New York County: Schoneboom v. B.B. King Blues Club

What do Kill Your Idols, Sub Zero and the Crumb Suckers have in common? They were all heavy metal bands (no offense to the bands if they take issue with the court’s characterization) playing B.B. King’s on August 3, 2006. Mr. Schoneboom was a big-bad-band fan. For him, you’re never too old for a little “slam dancing,” the more “aggressive” form of the ever-popular and intimate “moshing.” 36-year-old Schoneboom was a veteran of the slam-dance two step, having attended more than a hundred concerts where he frolicked in the mosh pits at least thirty to forty times.

The events in question took place during the Crumb Suckers set (in case you were wondering).

The night had begun pleasant enough. While Kill Your Idols was performing, plaintiff went to the lower level to get a better view of the slam dancing going on. A “good time” was being had by all as the fans bounced around off each other in a kinetic frenzy of fun and fisticuffs. After the set, plaintiff returned to his seat in the upper level, away from mosh central. Then Sub Zero came on. As Schoneboom describes it, the slam dancing now seemed “quite a bit more malicious.” Dancers were throwing themselves into non-participants, elbows were being thrown and celebrants were "taking potshots at perimeter people.” For this set, plaintiff remained in the demilitarized zone of the upper level.

But when the Crumb Suckers were about to come on, Schoneboom threw caution to the wind. He found his way to a spot 10 -12 feet from stage, directly in front of the moshkateers. At seven minutes into the performance, plaintiff “felt a shove from behind into the side of his knee which felt like a kick,” but didn’t see which mosher had mashed him. Plaintiff ended up with a knee injury and surgery. He then sued B.B. King’s.

Much to his dismay, the court slam-danced Schoneboom right out of court.

“If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed his duty” to exercise reasonable care. This is a longstanding rule of law that applies to all sorts of activities, including ball games, horseback riding and even samba dancing.

Schoneboom staked out his turf near the stage and the mosh pit only moments after having observed the more “malicious” slam-dancing that occurred when Sub Zero was performing. “Here, plaintiff not only elected to assume the risk of concert-going in a mosh dancing venue but was in the position, given his experience, to fully appreciate the risk.”

As for the injury, that he did not appreciate.

For Schoneboom court was a bust and there would be no dancing for dollars.

Case dismissed.

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Posted In: Culture War , Injuries , It's My Right! , New York State Courts

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Supreme Court, New York County: Sugarman v. Equinox Holdings, Inc.

For all the Gym-rats out there who prefer the health club to the basement or your building's own work-out room, rider beware.

Plaintiff Stuart Sugarman is a Spin Class enthusiast. His indoor cycling regimen brought him regularly to the Equinox Gym in the Wall Street area downtown. For the uninitiated, and if we take Mr. Sugarman at his word, spinners customarily like to cheer and shout during the class to pump up their psyche along with their sprocket. It was during one of these classes that Sugarman’s cheering got under the skin of fellow spinner Christopher Carter. Apparently, Mr. Carter was either having a bad day or he thought it bad form by the whooping Mr. Sugarman to disturb his peddling peace.

Carter first took it directly to Sugarman by yelling and cursing at him. When that diplomatic approach failed to dampen Sugarman’s enthusiasm, Carter dismounted and complained to the instructor about the boisterous biker. The instructor declined to intervene. This was followed by more yelling and cursing by Carter (who must have thought the first round of peace talks was too insubstantial to be effective), which was followed by even more enthusiastic cheering and shouting by Sugarman. Having apparently concluded that their conflict was at a stalemate, Carter “got off his bike again and ‘picked up the front of plaintiff’s cycle with plaintiff upon the unit and pushed him into the wall of the classroom leaving a hole in the sheetrock,’” injuring Sugarman’s back and neck and leaving him prone in the no-spin zone.

Sugarman sued and filed criminal charges against Carter. In the criminal case, Carter coasted and beat the rap. His civil case for damages is still pending. The same can no longer be said about the case of negligence against the Equinox Health Club.

Equinox moved for summary judgment to dismiss Sugarman’s case, claiming, among other things, that Equinox could not be held responsible for Carter’s violent outburst. Sugarman opposed. According to Sugarman the club failed to intercede at the argument stage and failed to remove Carter when he showed aggressive tendencies just before his “spin rage” occurred. It also failed to call the cops or EMS and was otherwise negligent in the way it ran the club, as demonstrated by Carter’s cycle sneak attack. But there in lies the rub.

In an unusually lengthy and involved decision, the court dismissed the case against Equinox. In order to hold the club responsible for Carter’s assault, it had to have notice that he had criminal tendencies, a pattern of criminal behavior or what the court considered a clue that an attack was imminent. The problem with making such a finding, however, was that plaintiff himself never feared for his safety or was ever intimidated by Carter, as demonstrated by Sugarman’s remonstrative good cheer in response to Carter’s vituperations. As the court observed, “Plaintiff’s own testimony fails to establish that even plaintiff foresaw the alleged assault by Mr. Carter.” So how could the club be responsible?

The court went on to find that “verbal tirades” don’t put the club on notice of a potential physical assault, that “heated words” without more don’t put the club on notice and that the exchange of jeers for cheers never rose to the level of dispute or argument, which might have created liability for the gym. According to the court, nothing that happened between Sugarman and Carter gave warning of the impending attack (which is a stretch in New York, since merely looking at someone the wrong way can get you killed). Under the circumstances, Equinox was not liable.

As for not calling the police or EMS at Sugarman’s request, the court observed the general rule that, “from time immemorial our courts have held that there is no legal responsibility to do so.” Well that’s a relief.

And as for the claim that Equinox negligently hired an instructor who failed to intervene before words turned to action, the same lack of notice that these exchanges were about to erupt into violence applies to the instructor, which means Equinox is off the hook on this theory as well.

No matter how you spin this case, Sugarman is not left with much to shout about. We’ll see if Carter steers clear of liability when he rides into court, or whether the ebullient Mr. Surgarman will finally get to salute Carter with a Bronx Cheer of victory.

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Posted In: Damages , Evidence , Injuries , New York State Courts , Speech , Strange but True

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Supreme Court of Florida: US v. Maureen Stevens

Robert Stevens worked for American Media Inc., publishers of the National Enquirer. In 2001, letters containing anthrax were sent to a number of recipients, including American Media in Florida. Mr. Stevens died from inhaling the anthrax. His wife sued the United States (it was their anthrax) and Battelle Memorial Institute, a private facility that produced Bacillus Anthracis for the government.

Both cases ended up in Federal Court. The suit by the widow Stevens alleged that the anthrax that killed her husband could be traced to the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, that the Feds knew it was “ultra hazardous,” that samples had been missing since 1992 and that there was a failure to provided adequate security for handling and shipping such materials, which were somehow intercepted and ended up in an envelope addressed to American Media’s Florida offices, killing her husband when he unknowingly inhaled its contents. The suit against Batelle made similar claims about lack of security, failure to monitor employees and negligence in the handling and transport of Anthrax causing it to end up in the wrong hands.

Both defendants moved to dismiss claiming they could not be responsible if their Anthrax was stolen and that such intervening criminal acts relieved them from responsibility for the death of Robert Stevens.
The Federal District Court denied defendants’ motions after looking to Florida law to see whether Mrs. Stevens’ anthrax theory of negligence was recognized in the Sunshine State. It concluded that Florida law supported the widow’s claim under the state’s “foreseeable zone of risk” theory. The government moved for reconsideration, which was denied, but it was granted leave to have this question answered by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: What duties exist under Florida law to protect members of the public where an organization creates a significant risk by using anthrax or another ultra-hazardous material.” The Eleventh Circuit then sent that question to the Florida High Court to answer.

Obviously this sort of question affects everyone. If the Government wants to make anthrax, well, fine. If it has to get it from a lab, well, where else can it shop for the stuff. But if it’s going to have it delivered by messenger, or FedEx or UPS or its own private couriers, shouldn’t there be some awareness that it could kill unsuspecting and uninvolved people who come in contact with it, and some meaningful precautions to prevent that from happening? And shouldn’t those who make, handle and ship anthrax to wherever anthrax gets shipped, make sure that they have an inventory system that at least rivals Wal-Mart and a security system as advanced as Blockbuster’s. Or do the government and its labs get a pass because their anthrax work is so vital that the best we can hope for is that none of us end up on the wrong mailing list.

Not quite.

You’ll be happy to know that the Florida Supreme Court found that widow Stevens has a right to sue. Whether the anthrax was misplaced, pocketed, or fell off the truck (or out of the Petri dish), the court concluded that the greater the risk of harm to others, the greater the duty to avoid injury to others:

In coping with the heightened duty that comes with this risk, the government and Battelle are required to contemplate a countless variety of situations in which a reasonable laboratory in their position must anticipate and guard against the unauthorized interception and dissemination of the dangerous substance. Given the allegations of negligent security of the ultrahazardous material and the virtual impossibility of potential victims to protect themselves once this substance is at large, this is obviously one of those cases...where the risk of injury is great and the corresponding duty of the lab is heightened. In a very real sense, it is this inability to measure the extent of this risk that merits giving the claimants an opportunity to go forward.

So for Mrs. Stevens, it’s back to the Federal Court with her golden ticket in hand. Now that she has the right to proceed, it remains to be seen if she has the right evidence to prevail.

We should all applaud her persistence since what happened to Robert could have happened to any one of us. If the Government and its labs don’t know how to keep track of their toxins and plagues or properly monitor the scientists and employees who make and transport powdered death, they shouldn’t be allowed to play with it.

One hates to think that the only powder they can be trusted with is Tang.

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Posted In: Anthrax , Damages , Government Negligence , Injuries , Other State Courts , Terrorism , War on Terror , Wrongful Death

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New York Supreme Court: Bossy v. Camelback

Solicitation Plus. It sounds like what brought down the former governor of New York. It's not quite as juicy, but without it, your New York case against a foreign corporation with a website on the net goes nowhere.

Why is this important? It depends how you use the internet.

In this case, Evan Bossy was injured when he skied into an unpadded pole on the beginner trail at Camelback, a ski resort located in Pennsylvania. Evan’s parents brought suit in New York on Evan’s behalf, suing Camelback for negligence.

Camelback moved to dismiss the case, claiming it could not be sued in New York because the court had no personal jurisdiction over this out-of-state corporation. Camelback runs a ski resort in Pennsylvania. It is not a New York corporation (any business incorporated outside of New York is a foreign corporation). It has no employees or offices in New York, was not negligent in New York and does not transact business in New York.

It does, however, have a website. Plaintiffs claim that Camelback is always “doing business” in New York “by virtue of its constant presence here through its interactive website” where skiers can book reservations and purchase lift tickets on line. Moreover, Camelback “solicits” New York customers by “placement of advertising flyers in New York retail ski shops.”

The question is whether this is enough business to be considered doing business as that is defined by New York law. According to the court, it’s not enough and it dismissed the case. An interactive website alone will not give you jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. You need more. You need “the presences of traditional indicia of doing business” or substantial and continuous solicitation...coupled with financial and commercial dealings or other activities of substance in New York,” i.e., solicitation plus.

Even if the court treated Camelback's interactive website as a constant solicitation, absent other factors such as engagement in financial or commercial dealing or other activities of substance in New York, such cyber-office-space does not meet the solicitation plus threshold which would confer jurisdiction on this foreign corporation. Under the circumstances, proper venue would either be Federal Court or Pennsylvania.

So back in New York, case dismissed. Such is the result of applying Flintstone rules to Jetson-age problems. One suspects the state legislature and the higher courts will eventually have to sort through all the nuances of cyber commerce, but until then these matters will be resolved on a website by website basis.

What does that mean for web browsers and shoppers in the Empire State? The home page may get the home court advantage if there’s a problem on line. And it means buyer beware when you add to your cart.

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Posted In: Damages , Injuries , New York State Courts , The Internet

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Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department: State Farm v. Langan

In politics you have to “follow the money” to figure out why some laws pass and others don’t. In automobile accidents, you have to figure out if there’s insurance coverage to compensate the injured party. That’s especially tricky if the car is a murder weapon.

On February 12, 2008 Neil Spicehandler was struck and fatally injured by a car driven by Ronald Popadich. Popadich was on a murderous spree which included killing a neighbor, shooting a cabbie, attempting and then succeeding in running down a pedestrian, namely, the late Mr. Spicehandler. In September 2005 Popadich pleaded guilty to second degree murder.

The guilty verdict presented a tough issue for John Langan, Administrator of the Estate of Mr. Spicehandler. How can you collect in a civil suit from a driver who intends to kill the victim? Intentional criminal acts are not covered by automobile insurance. Accidents are. Since this was no accident, there was no way to collect from any policy issued for the murderous driver’s vehicle. So Langan looked to his own State Farm auto policy, which he claimed covered Spicehandler in two ways. State Farm, in turn, sued to have the case dismissed and to free it from any financial responsibility under Langan’s auto policy since this was murder, plain and simple.

Maybe not so plain or simple. First, the court agreed that Spicehandler’s Estate could not collect under the uninsured motorist endorsement of Langan’s policy. The uninsured motorist endorsement (of the injured party’s insurance policy) provides coverage for a person when the offending car has either no insurance or limited insurance; it then kicks in as if it were the coverage for the other car, or it kicks in to provide additional coverage above what the other car carried. As the court said, since Popadich couldn’t have coverage for his intentional act of murder, “it follows, then, that, because no coverage would have been provided under a standard automobile liability policy issued to Papadich, State Farm is not obligated to provide benefits under the uninsured motorist endorsement of its policy with Langan.”

So State Farm is clear? Not quite.

Langan pointed to his State Farm policy’s “mandatory personal injury protection endorsement and its death, dismemberment, and loss of sight provisions” and said this was still an accident as that’s defined in his policy and State Farm had to pay. The court agreed.

Even though Mr. Spicehandler was murdered, an intentional act from the viewpoint of the murderer, from the viewpoint of the one murdered “the event was ‘unexpected, unusual and unforeseen’ and not brought about by the insured’s own ‘misconduct, provocation or assault.’” And it was the covered individual’s perspective that governed. Without a specific exclusion for injury or death caused by an intentional act in the State Farm Policy, the insurance company was on the hook and obligated to provide benefits because murder or not, Mr.Spicehandler didn't see death coming.

The old TV show was called Murder, She Wrote. For the Insurance carrier, unless it writes an exclusion for murder, the events are seen from the victim’s eyes, and one thing everyone can agree on is that from the victim’s perspective, murder is “unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”

One suspects that to State Farm Insurance this decision was also “unexpected, unusual and unforeseen” and that it never knew it was going to get murdered in court.

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Posted In: Auto Accidents , Damages , Injuries , New York State Courts , Wrongful Death

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001

Fifteen of the nineteen terrorists involved in the 911 attacks were Saudis. Why not sue the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and various other seemingly responsible parties (including four Saudi Princes, a Saudi Banker and the Saudi High Commission) for their support role in the attacks? After all, investigations by our government and by non-governmental entities revealed that most of the terrorists were from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that the defendants provided financial support to al Queda through various channels. The plaintiffs are those who incurred losses in the September 11th attacks. They alleged that Islamic charities under the control of, and funded by, the defendants played an instrumental role in the development of al Queda and the fulfillment of its objectives.

One of the great things about the American justice system is access to the courts. Private citizens and their attorneys have been able to bring actions in court seeking remedies for similar wrongs (Libya was sued for the hijacking and murders aboard Pan Am Flight 73 in 1986, and for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland which killed all 270 people on board; Swiss banks were sued for corroborating with Nazis and laundering Nazi wealth taken from Jews who died in the Holocaust). Well, what about suing those behind the World Trade Center attacks?

Great idea. Only one problem: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) “grants foreign sovereigns immunity from suit in the United States” subject to some limited exceptions, which include torts (car accidents, negligence or injury caused by their representatives) and commercial activity (when the government acts like an individual involved in trade or commerce).

The other exception is created when the US Government designates a foreign government a “state sponsor of terrorism.” When that occurs, there is a private right of action to sue the foreign government. That’s what happened here. Except the State Department did NOT designate Saudi Arabia a state sponsor of terrorism.

No designation, no day in court.

Whether all the defendants in this action are agents or servants of the Saudi Kingdom and actually did what the plaintiffs claimed, the victims of 911 have no right to sue the Saudis under the state sponsor of terrorism exception. And their fall-back positions—that the acts of flying planes into the World Trade Center fit under the tort or commercial activity exceptions—were unconvincing. This was terrorism, and that was the only exception available to the plaintiffs.

The Court summed up the limits of our individual right to sue foreign powers this way:
"Although the FSIA did open an avenue of redress for certain individual victims of state-sponsored terrorism, it did not delegate to the victims, their counsel and the courts the responsibility of the executive branch to make America’s foreign policy response to acts of terrorism committed by a foreign state, including whether federal courts may entertain a victim’s claim for damages." The case was dismissed.

Maybe this is the rare instance where we wish lawyers had more power than they already have.

September 11th may not have been brought to us by any recognized state-sponsored terrorists, but it sure looks like it was. The "state-sponsored" loophole is as big as Ground Zero and leaves one wondering why the attorneys' hands are tied while the terrorists funded by "non-state" sponsors reach all the way into NYC, DC and the skies above Pennsylvania without ever having to answer in court for their actions.

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Posted In: Crime and Punishment , Damages , Injuries , Politics , U.S. Court of Appeals , War on Terror

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New Jersey Supreme Court: Culter v. Dorn

As they say in Jersey, “You talkin' to me?”

That question had to be in Jason Culter’s mind every time he heard comments in the office about “those dirty Jews.” Every time he was referred to as “the Jew.” Every time he was asked by his boss “where [his] big Jew… nose was?” And the time his coworker suggested that we should “get rid of all those dirty Jews.”

And what if all those folks making the comments were armed. Do you call the police?

You don’t if you’re a cop.

And you don’t if the people making the comments were also cops and coworkers.

This was the work environment at the Haddonfield New Jersey Police Department. Not exactly Jersey’s Finest.

Culter was reluctant to make waves and thought he was thick-skinned enough to ignore it all, but a few threatening incidents and comments too many put him over the top. He brought an action under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD) claiming he was subjected to a hostile work environment because he was Jewish. In its defense, the police department claimed Culter was a willing participant in all the fun and that it was all just harmless police department chop busting. The judges were not amused and seemed not to get the joke.

According to the court, “The LAD’s promise of a discrimination-free workplace” extends to matters of faith. “Antagonistic, degrading, or demeaning conduct in the workplace that is directed at or about one’s religious faith, or ancestry, can be discriminatory and can amount to an unlawful hostile environment.” The Haddenfiled precinct was such a place.

The court found that Culter met the threshold for demonstrating a religion-based discriminatory work environment. It also found that the standard of proof to demonstrate a religion-based hostile environment was no different than what was required to show a sexually or racially-based hostile workplace. Hatred and job-related abuse of authority come in all shapes and sizes, but it’s all equally unacceptable.

Given the times we live in, one has to wonder what the members of the Haddonfield Police Department were thinking. Or does anti-Semitism make you both reckless and clueless. These cops would have been better off if they followed there own advice and remained silent. After all, the original “Miranda” warning comes from an old Jewish book (Proverbs 17:28) which says this: “Even a fool is thought wise if he keeps silent, and discerning if he holds his tongue.” Alas, such was not the case here, and before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Haddonfield Police Department didn’t have a prayer.

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Posted In: Employment Discrimination , Injuries , Other State Courts , Religion , Speech

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Texas Supreme Court: Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert

If you believe in Jesus, you’ve come to understand him from the New Testament. Well, the same scriptures that teach about Jesus also teach about demons and the laying on of hands by church elders. If you accept Jesus, then consistency demands that you accept the other things the Bible teaches. Or does it?

17 year old Laura Shubert attended the Pleasant Glade Assembly of God Church. In fact, her own father was an Assembly of God pastor and missionary. The Assemblies of God is a Pentecostal denomination. It “believes in the literal teachings of the Bible with respect to spirits, demons, demon possession and the ‘casting out’ of demons.” It also believes that people can be “slain in the spirit,” which, according to the church, “is a positive experience in which the holy spirit comes over a person and influences them.” The Bible refers to this as being “filled with the spirit” and believers are encouraged to be filled with the spirit again and again.

Laura Shubert had such an experience. In fact, she had it twice in a matter of days. While slain in the spirit the second time, however, Laura’s physical reaction was so significant that the senior pastor was summoned. He laid hands on Laura and prayed for her. Because of the animated way Laura was reacting, she suffered carpet burns, a scrape on her back and minor bruises.

Laura’s experience led to a meeting between her father, Pastor Shubert, and Pastor McCutchen, the one who had laid hands on Laura. A theological discussion ensued and both agreed that Christians cannot be demon possessed (there was apparently a question whether Laura was manifesting the Holy Spirit or was being tormented by an evil spirit). As a result of that meeting, the church agreed to teach more on the subject so its young members would better understand what the Bible says about being filled with the spirit and what it says about demons.

Notwithstanding the theological explanations given, Laura subsequently became depressed, dropped out of school and abandoned her plan to attend Bible College. She was finally diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and she and her parents blamed the church and sued Pleasant Glade for the injuries and emotional distress she suffered. (There apparently was not much debate about the Bible’s proscription about believers suing fellow believers.)

Laura won at trial. A jury awarded her damages of $300,000 for pain and suffering and other losses. The Court of Appeals in Texas affirmed most of the decision, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed it all.

Laura’s experience, good, bad or otherwise, was not a matter for the courts. As the Supreme Court explained, “Whether the defendants had intentionally or negligently misapplied church doctrine to Laura during these events was not a justiciable controversy...because the ‘First Amendment [gave] Pleasant Glade the right to engage in driving out demons.’”

The court also found that “The ‘laying of hands’ and the presence of demons are part of the church’s belief system and accepted as such by its adherents. These practices are not normally dangerous or unusual and apparently arise in the church with some regularity. They are thus to be expected and are accepted by those in the church. That a particular member may find the practice emotionally disturbing and non-consensual when applied to her does not transform the dispute into a secular matter.”

Laura’s case was dismissed.

The courts have always struggled to balance religious expression and individual rights. In this case, whatever happened “in the spirit” was clearly not the court’s business. But this sort of controversy is not going away. The Bible does more than explore spiritual matters, it judges certain matters of the flesh, including lust, homosexuality, pride and adultery; it is only a matter of time before the words of the Bible are challenged as so offensive they must be silenced. Another, less constrained court, may agree and choose to step into the fray.

God help us.

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Posted In: Damages , Injuries , Other State Courts , Religion , Strange but True

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: Stamp v. Metroplitan Life Ins. Co.

If you get so drunk—3 times the legal limit—that you crash your car into a tree and die as a result, does your family collect from your accidental death and dismemberment life insurance policy? Affirming the Rhode Island District Court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals says your family does not collect anything. The policy in question did not clearly define what an “accident” was, so the court had to: It concluded that Mr. Stamp was “so highly intoxicated that his death was not an ‘accident.’” It went on to find that when you are behind the wheel this drunk, you should “objectively and reasonably” expect to die or be seriously injured.

The dissent saw it differently, finding that Mr. Stamp did not set out to kill himself and that the circumstances of his death were no more than a “fatal mistake.” Under the circumstances, his wife should have collected from the insurance policy.

Fatal mistakes cannot be undone. Think twice before you get behind the wheel drunk. You may kill yourself and your family’s chances of surviving without you.

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Posted In: Auto Accidents , Drunk Driving , Injuries , U.S. Court of Appeals , Wrongful Death

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