May 9, 2010

Freedom of Religion: Mad Hatters

US District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern District: CAIR v. Judge William Callahan

Is this a blow against Muslim freedom of religion or not? You decide. The District Court upheld Wayne County Judge William Callahan’s declaration to hijab-wearing plaintiff Raneen Albaghdady, “No hats allowed in the courtroom.”

When told her headwear was not permitted, Ms. Albaghdady responded, “Okay. It doesn’t matter,” and removed the hijab. Her name change application then proceeded to decision (unfavorable, it turns out, because she filed without meeting the residency requirement), to be followed by a successful reapplication some time later.

The guardians of all things Islam, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), apparently heard about Judge Callahan’s ethnic and religious insensitivity and filed this action “seeking a ‘declaration that the customary practice of … Callahan, in requiring Muslim women to remove their hijab violated’ Albaghdady’s ‘fundamental right to freely practice her religion’ in violation of the First Amendment.”

Judge Callahan moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed CAIR’s action. Blogs began to report this as another encroachment on Islamic freedom of religion. The decision will actually have the exact opposite effect. Albaghdady’s problem was not her religion, but apparently how she viewed the head cover. As she put it, it didn't matter. So she took it off. According to the District Court, if it didn't matter in the lower court, it couldn't matter later when she decided to sue in Federal Court.

CAIR claimed that the Judges no-hat policy is unconstitutional because it deprived Albaghdady of her right to exercise her religion and therefore restricted her access to the no-headgear judicial system of which Judge Callahan is a part.

Based on the facts at bar, the District Court could not find an applicable exception to the judicial immunity extended judges in the exercise of their duties. Moreover, the court’s conduct at issue is this case involved controlling dress and demeanor of parties participating in proceedings before the court, clearly the exercise of a duty within Judge Callahan’s juridical capacity.

As for the constitutional issue, plaintiff wanted to know what Judge Callahan knew and when he knew it, insisting he had to be familiar with the religious implications of the hijab because Wayne County is “home to the largest concentration of Arab-American Muslims outside of the Middle East” and the judge had 22 years experience on the bench. The inference was clear: Judge Callahan knew this was no ordinary hat, but was, rather, a religious head covering.

Decent arguments all, except that the exchange between parties was recorded on videotape, and it was clear that removing the hijab for Ms. Albaghdady was no big deal, and not a peep of religious protest was uttered at the time, notwithstanding Ms. Albaghdady’s subsequent claim that she was “terrified and scared” because in America, you just “can't say no to a judge in a court room.”

Based largely on the video, the District Court concluded that “This is not a situation where a government actor required removal of the hijab after the wearer asserted her First Amendment rights. There simply is no evidence that Callahan would have required the removal of a head covering if he had known of its religious significance.”

So does this case encroach on the religious freedom of hijab-wearing Muslim women? (or Muslim women wearing Burqas, Niqabs or Chadors for that matter). Hardly. It just sets out the requirement that they raise a timely religious protest of some sort which will apparently guarantee that they can wear the headgear of their choice to the courtroom of their preference.

Hats off to the court for defending the American way of life.

Or not.

November 19, 2008

Anthrax Exposure: Inquiring Minds Want to Know Who’s Responsible?

Supreme Court of Florida: US v. Maureen Stevens

Robert Stevens worked for American Media Inc., publishers of the National Enquirer. In 2001, letters containing anthrax were sent to a number of recipients, including American Media in Florida. Mr. Stevens died from inhaling the anthrax. His wife sued the United States (it was their anthrax) and Battelle Memorial Institute, a private facility that produced Bacillus Anthracis for the government.

Both cases ended up in Federal Court. The suit by the widow Stevens alleged that the anthrax that killed her husband could be traced to the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, that the Feds knew it was “ultra hazardous,” that samples had been missing since 1992 and that there was a failure to provided adequate security for handling and shipping such materials, which were somehow intercepted and ended up in an envelope addressed to American Media’s Florida offices, killing her husband when he unknowingly inhaled its contents. The suit against Batelle made similar claims about lack of security, failure to monitor employees and negligence in the handling and transport of Anthrax causing it to end up in the wrong hands.

Both defendants moved to dismiss claiming they could not be responsible if their Anthrax was stolen and that such intervening criminal acts relieved them from responsibility for the death of Robert Stevens.
The Federal District Court denied defendants’ motions after looking to Florida law to see whether Mrs. Stevens’ anthrax theory of negligence was recognized in the Sunshine State. It concluded that Florida law supported the widow’s claim under the state’s “foreseeable zone of risk” theory. The government moved for reconsideration, which was denied, but it was granted leave to have this question answered by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals: What duties exist under Florida law to protect members of the public where an organization creates a significant risk by using anthrax or another ultra-hazardous material.” The Eleventh Circuit then sent that question to the Florida High Court to answer.

Obviously this sort of question affects everyone. If the Government wants to make anthrax, well, fine. If it has to get it from a lab, well, where else can it shop for the stuff. But if it’s going to have it delivered by messenger, or FedEx or UPS or its own private couriers, shouldn’t there be some awareness that it could kill unsuspecting and uninvolved people who come in contact with it, and some meaningful precautions to prevent that from happening? And shouldn’t those who make, handle and ship anthrax to wherever anthrax gets shipped, make sure that they have an inventory system that at least rivals Wal-Mart and a security system as advanced as Blockbuster’s. Or do the government and its labs get a pass because their anthrax work is so vital that the best we can hope for is that none of us end up on the wrong mailing list.

Not quite.

You’ll be happy to know that the Florida Supreme Court found that widow Stevens has a right to sue. Whether the anthrax was misplaced, pocketed, or fell off the truck (or out of the Petri dish), the court concluded that the greater the risk of harm to others, the greater the duty to avoid injury to others:

In coping with the heightened duty that comes with this risk, the government and Battelle are required to contemplate a countless variety of situations in which a reasonable laboratory in their position must anticipate and guard against the unauthorized interception and dissemination of the dangerous substance. Given the allegations of negligent security of the ultrahazardous material and the virtual impossibility of potential victims to protect themselves once this substance is at large, this is obviously one of those cases...where the risk of injury is great and the corresponding duty of the lab is heightened. In a very real sense, it is this inability to measure the extent of this risk that merits giving the claimants an opportunity to go forward.

So for Mrs. Stevens, it’s back to the Federal Court with her golden ticket in hand. Now that she has the right to proceed, it remains to be seen if she has the right evidence to prevail.

We should all applaud her persistence since what happened to Robert could have happened to any one of us. If the Government and its labs don’t know how to keep track of their toxins and plagues or properly monitor the scientists and employees who make and transport powdered death, they shouldn’t be allowed to play with it.

One hates to think that the only powder they can be trusted with is Tang.