From: Subject: People v Buchanan (2009 NY Slip Op 05367) Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2009 16:01:41 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_05367.htm X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3198 People v Buchanan (2009 NY Slip Op 05367)
People v Buchanan
2009 NY Slip Op 05367
Decided on June 30, 2009
Court of Appeals
Per Curiam
Published by New York State = Law=20 Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law =A7 = 431.
This opinion is uncorrected = and=20 subject to revision before publication in the Official=20 Reports.


Decided on June 30, = 2009=20

No. 101

[*1]The People=20 & c., Respondent,

v

Ingvue E. Buchanan, Appellant.=20





Thomas Theophilos, for appellant. =
Lynn=20 S. Hodgens, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:=20

We hold that a stun belt may not be used to restrain a defendant in a = criminal case without a finding of specific facts justifying the use of = such a=20 restraint.=20

I

Defendant was charged with the murder, by strangulation, of a = 14-year-old=20 girl. After jury selection and before opening statements, the trial = judge said=20 "it is my policy in cases of this nature, this degree of seriousness, to = have=20 the defendant either in leg shackles, which I don't like to do, or the = belt that=20 can deliver a shock should there be a problem." Addressing defendant = directly,=20 the court added: "I do believe it is necessary not just for you . . . . = This is=20 something I [*2]would do for anybody = charged with=20 murder." Defendant's counsel and defendant himself objected strenuously. = When=20 defendant said, "I have done nothing to warrant this," the court = replied: "I=20 can't disagree with you. You have not done anything to warrant that." = But the=20 court decided to require a stun belt "in the interest of being overly = cautious=20 for security." The court also asked an officer who was present: "The = Sheriff's=20 Department's position is you would like that to remain on?", to which = the=20 officer answered, "Yes".=20

At the end of the first day of trial, defendant complained that the = belt was=20 uncomfortable, and the court ordered that he be examined. At the = beginning of=20 the next trial day, the court said it had received a report to the = effect that=20 the defendant "has no medical reason not to use the shock belt" and = ordered the=20 belt kept on. To defendant's continued protests, the court replied that = it had=20 to rely on "the security experts," and again assured defendant that the = court's=20 ruling was nothing personal; the court said that even "an innocent man = on trial=20 for murder" could be dangerous. Defendant thus wore a stun belt under = his=20 clothing for the duration of his trial.=20

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, and the Appellate = Division=20 affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. An Appellate Division Justice = granted=20 leave to appeal, and we now reverse.=20

II

Defendant argues that the use of the stun belt deprived him of due = process of=20 law, relying on Deck v Missouri (544 US 622, 626 [2005]), in = which the=20 United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibits a = state=20 from confining a defendant in "visible shackles" during a criminal = trial, unless=20 a "special need," based on facts specific to the case, is shown. The = People=20 argue that Deck is distinguishable because the stun belt here was = not=20 visible to the jury. We need not reach the constitutional issue, = however, for we=20 conclude as a matter of New York law that it is unacceptable to make a = stun belt=20 a routine adjunct of every murder trial, without a specifically = identified=20 security reason.=20

We have no doubt that there are cases in which a court may properly = find,=20 considering the nature of the charged offense, the defendant's history = and other=20 relevant factors, that a stun belt is necessary, but those factors must = be=20 considered before that finding is made. Thus, we adopt the rule that a = stun belt=20 may not be required unless the trial court makes findings on the record = showing=20 that the particular defendant before him needs such a restraint. A = formal=20 hearing may not be necessary, but the trial court must conduct a = sufficient=20 inquiry to satisfy itself of the facts that warrant the restraint. Where = it does=20 so, a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a restraint = is=20 necessary for courtroom security.=20

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed = and a new=20 trial ordered.


READ, J. (DISSENTING): [*3]

I agree with the majority that the trial judge in this case should = have=20 explained on the record why, to safeguard courtroom security, he ordered = defendant to wear a stun belt during trial. In this case, however, the=20 presumption of innocence was not implicated by the judge's failure to = inquire=20 about the particular need for use of a stun belt and to make factual = findings on=20 the record. Defendant =97 a man in his thirties who apparently stands = more than 6=20 feet tall and weighs over 300 pounds =97 repeatedly protested that the = stun belt=20 was uncomfortable (a complaint that the judge ordered a physician to = evaluate),=20 and that he should not have to wear this restraint because he was = presumed to be=20 innocent. But defendant failed to show that the stun belt was visible to = the=20 jury or otherwise compromised the fundamental fairness of the trial; he = never=20 objected that the stun belt impaired his ability to communicate with his = attorney or meaningfully participate in his defense. Since I therefore = do not=20 believe that defendant has shown any actual prejudice, I would affirm = his=20 conviction (see e.g. Oregon v Bowen, 340 Or 487, 496, 135 P3d = 272, 279=20 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1214 [2007]).
* * * * * * * * * * = * * * *=20 * * *
Order reversed and a new trial ordered. Opinion Per Curiam. =
Chief=20 Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones = concur.=20 Judge Read dissents and votes to affirm in an
opinion.
Decided = June 30,=20 2009

=20