Posted On: May 19, 2010

Cost of Living: No Wrongful Life

New York Appellate Division, Second Department: DeChico v. Northern Westchester Hospital Center et. al.

Gianluca DeChico was born with schizencephaly, “a rare and sever congenital brain defect.” On her own behalf and on behalf of her child, Gianluco’s mother sued all involved with her prenatal care for the “extraordinary costs of the child’s medical care,” basing her case on the failure of her health care providers 1) to fully explain the implications of prenatal sonograms showing a ventricle defect on one side of the baby’s brain, 2) to conduct further tests, and 3) to fully advise mom about the abortion option.

Defendants moved to dismiss. The lower court denied their motion for summary judgment. Defendants appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the case against movants. As the court observed, “It is well settled that no cause of action may be maintained on behalf of an infant plaintiff for wrongful life, ‘i.e., that he or she would never have been born but for the negligence of the defendant…” Accordingly, that part of the child’s action which sounded in wrongful had to be dismissed. A child cannot sue for being born, no matter what his condition. The child can, however, sue for injuries or conditions caused as a result of medical negligence. In this case, however, based on the time line and the allegations made, “any negligence on the part of the defendants did not proximately cause the complained-of damages.”

While the court would not recognize the child’s claim for wrongful life, it acknowledged a cause of action on the mother’s behalf for the costs to be incurred in raising a child with a disability (wrongful expenses rather than wrongful life). In order to prevail on such a claim, mom had to prove a duty owed, breach of that duty, and that the breach caused the injuries, i.e., she had to show medical negligence (malpractice) which deprived her of the opportunity to avoid incurring such expenses. Mom’s argument was that those expenses would have been avoided by an abortion. But even this argument had it limitations. According to the court, she had to show that the doctors denied her the opportunity to terminate her pregnancy “within the legally permissible time period or that the child would not have been conceived but for the defendants’ malpractice.” That, she could not do.

Nothing the doctors did caused the condition. No other tests would have changed the outcome. And the advice given was sufficient, particularly in light of New York’s Criminal Code. As the court observed:

It is undisputed that at the time of the April 21, 2004, ultrasound, the gestation period was 27 weeks and six days, plus or minus 18 days (i.e. at least 25 weeks). Pursuant to Penal Law § 125.05, it is unlawful for a physician, pregnant woman, or other person to terminate a pregnancy after the twenty-fourth week of gestation, unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother.

Given when the condition was discovered, how far along the pregnancy was and the proscriptions of New York’s abortion law, “any negligence by the defendants in connection with treatment, testing, or advice after the April 21, 2004 ultrasound cannot be said to have proximately caused the complained-of injuries, namely, the continuation of the pregnancy and birth of the child.” Movant’s did what they had to do. They did not have to send mom out of state for an abortion or even tell her late term abortions were available elsewhere. They are judged by the standard of care in New York where abortion was not an option this late in the pregnancy and doctors could not be faulted for failing to circumvent New York’s legislative constraints by sending mom elsewhere.

Sometimes life can be cruel and the negligence of others can cause grievous injury. Other times life can be cruel and mysterious: bad things just seem to happen. In the latter case, the courts are grossly inadequate to unravel the mystery and set things right. Perhaps the biblical writers of old said it best and offer the only solace available:

As you do not know the path of the wind,
or how the body is formed in a mother's womb,
so you cannot understand the work of God,
the Maker of all things.

Ecclesiastes 11:5

Posted On: May 9, 2010

Freedom of Religion: Mad Hatters

US District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern District: CAIR v. Judge William Callahan

Is this a blow against Muslim freedom of religion or not? You decide. The District Court upheld Wayne County Judge William Callahan’s declaration to hijab-wearing plaintiff Raneen Albaghdady, “No hats allowed in the courtroom.”

When told her headwear was not permitted, Ms. Albaghdady responded, “Okay. It doesn’t matter,” and removed the hijab. Her name change application then proceeded to decision (unfavorable, it turns out, because she filed without meeting the residency requirement), to be followed by a successful reapplication some time later.

The guardians of all things Islam, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), apparently heard about Judge Callahan’s ethnic and religious insensitivity and filed this action “seeking a ‘declaration that the customary practice of … Callahan, in requiring Muslim women to remove their hijab violated’ Albaghdady’s ‘fundamental right to freely practice her religion’ in violation of the First Amendment.”

Judge Callahan moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed CAIR’s action. Blogs began to report this as another encroachment on Islamic freedom of religion. The decision will actually have the exact opposite effect. Albaghdady’s problem was not her religion, but apparently how she viewed the head cover. As she put it, it didn't matter. So she took it off. According to the District Court, if it didn't matter in the lower court, it couldn't matter later when she decided to sue in Federal Court.

CAIR claimed that the Judges no-hat policy is unconstitutional because it deprived Albaghdady of her right to exercise her religion and therefore restricted her access to the no-headgear judicial system of which Judge Callahan is a part.

Based on the facts at bar, the District Court could not find an applicable exception to the judicial immunity extended judges in the exercise of their duties. Moreover, the court’s conduct at issue is this case involved controlling dress and demeanor of parties participating in proceedings before the court, clearly the exercise of a duty within Judge Callahan’s juridical capacity.

As for the constitutional issue, plaintiff wanted to know what Judge Callahan knew and when he knew it, insisting he had to be familiar with the religious implications of the hijab because Wayne County is “home to the largest concentration of Arab-American Muslims outside of the Middle East” and the judge had 22 years experience on the bench. The inference was clear: Judge Callahan knew this was no ordinary hat, but was, rather, a religious head covering.

Decent arguments all, except that the exchange between parties was recorded on videotape, and it was clear that removing the hijab for Ms. Albaghdady was no big deal, and not a peep of religious protest was uttered at the time, notwithstanding Ms. Albaghdady’s subsequent claim that she was “terrified and scared” because in America, you just “can't say no to a judge in a court room.”

Based largely on the video, the District Court concluded that “This is not a situation where a government actor required removal of the hijab after the wearer asserted her First Amendment rights. There simply is no evidence that Callahan would have required the removal of a head covering if he had known of its religious significance.”

So does this case encroach on the religious freedom of hijab-wearing Muslim women? (or Muslim women wearing Burqas, Niqabs or Chadors for that matter). Hardly. It just sets out the requirement that they raise a timely religious protest of some sort which will apparently guarantee that they can wear the headgear of their choice to the courtroom of their preference.

Hats off to the court for defending the American way of life.

Or not.